Thirdly, I will confront Merleau-Ponty with the following question: Given the ontological primacy of sympathy in human ontogenesis, in what sense is it legitimate to speak of its ethical primacy in adult intersubjectivity? How does his argument from operative intentionality and precommunicative sympathy contribute to the possibility of communicative and existential ethics?
I. INTENTIONALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ALTERTTY
Husserl's clue to the primacy of operative, fungierende intentionality over reflective, thematic consciousness becomes the vehicle of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical argument for the primacy of sympathy over the role of constituting intentionality in founding and sustaining alterity.3
In our opinion Husserl's originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality; it is to be found in the elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath the intentionality of representations, of a deeper intentionality, which others have called existence. (PP 121, n. 5) Merleau-Ponty differentiates the thematic intentionality of acts or of understanding from operative intentionality. The former notion of intentionality relates to the world cognitively and in that sense exhibits thematic and constitutive consciousness. The latter as existential and not conceptual or objectifying carries my embodied meaning, my incarnation. Ricoeur notes that the theorem of operative intentionality has implications for the phenomenology of the body. "When asked how it is possible for a meaning to exist without being conscious, the phenomenologist replies: its mode of being is that of the body, which is neither an ego nor a thing of the world. Not Husserl but already Descartes and Kant directed the attention of modern philosophy to constitutive consciousness and the intentionality of acts (PP ix, xvii-xviii, 121, n. 5). The intentionality of acts explains that the unity of consciousness is not possible without the simultaneous apprehension of the unity of the world. 5 All consciousness occurs only as consciousness of something. The temporal determination of my inner perceptions is bound up by the outer perception of existing things in space. I come into being as consciousness only in relation to possible intentional objects (PP xvii, 121). Consciousness is conceived of as a network of intentional relations between the understanding subject and the object. Consciousness is "a pure meaning-giving act" (PP 121). Through the thematic acts I know my being in the world as a constituting, that is cognitive, relation of my conscious subjectivity to the intentional object. A methodology of reduction which only works out of the theorem of thematic intentionality must remain within the philosophy of consciousness, which is to say, a subject-centered phenomenology.
Merleau-Ponty does not jettison reflective phenomenology and the acts of thetic intentionality. Nevertheless, he limits his inquiry to the conditions of the possibility of thetic, constituting consciousness. In fairness to him, we should not interpret the ontological concerns in his phenomenological project as a denial of critical philosophy but rather as an exploration of the implicit presuppositions of phenomenology, of the ambiguity in phenomenological foundations. 6 His inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of one's cognitive relation to the world leads him to remains dependent on a philosophy of consciousness and of the subject? What is this world which we do not constitute as reflective consciousness but which we indeed seem to project as a tacit or bodily cogito? Husserl's clue about operative intentionality. Operative intentionality and temporality must be the prius of all cognitive comportment in the world (PP 418). According to the deeper (PP121), broadened (PP xviii), new (PP . 243) and true (PP 446) notion of intentionality, the unity of the world is not primarily posited or constituted cognitively but originates in a lived, antepredicative and existential unity.
In arguing for the primacy of operative intentionality which founds the cognitive judgment of perception, Merleau-Ponty critiques idealism for privileging thetic truth over one's existential being-in-theworld (PP 418, ix, xii-xiii, xvii-xviii). In his polemic against idealism and empiricism, he strives for a descriptive non-duality. But the thesis of the primacy of latent, pre-reflective intentionality is not a new form of longing for the noumenal, the pre-reflective in-itself, characteristic of idealism. This thesis suggests that my life world which pivots back and forth between the pre-reflective as such and the constitutive acts of knowledge and deliberation is the originator of the derived thematic distinction between my constitutive subjectivity and intentional objects. Merleau-Ponty does not jettison the proper use of the philosophical distinction between the thematic and the operative but assumes concrete posture within the life world which allows one to make this distinction legitimately. Idealist and empiricist points of departure neglect, truncate and alienate my lived and embodied existence. Operative intentionality, he argues, is a primary and founding dimension of one's being-in-the-world; although not an absolute foundation (we take it up as an already founded existence) it is originary "in the sense that the originated is presented as a determinate or explicit form of the originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing the former..." (PP 394). In his later work, Merleau-Ponty preserves the twoterm intentionality analysis but grounds the distinction not in the life world but within a non-dualistic ontology of Being.
The limit discovered in attempting Husserl's phenomenological reduction, i.e. that we never have apodictic knowledge, implies for Merleau-Ponty not only the primacy of operative over thetic intentionality but also the primacy of ontology over phenomenology: an explicit intentionality of cognitive acts presupposes an implicit "intentionality within being" (VI 244)7 Phenomenology requires an ontology; this requirement becomes fully explicit only in the later Merleau-Ponty. 8 His argument from operative intentionality suggests that there is an implicit ontology in his early work. 9 Since existential phenomenology already implies an ontology, he argues also in his social phenomenology for the ontological primacy of primordial sympathy over the thetic and deliberate human relationships.
The two notions of intentionality bear directly on the paradox of alterity (PP xii). Just as Merleau-Ponty's overall phenomenological argument is for the founding function of operative intentionality over cognitive intentionality, so also here he reasons for the affective and epistemological primacy of primordial sympathy over the dialectic of sympathy and antipathy in deliberate acts. The thesis of the primacy of sympathy has an ontological precedence over the developmentally later dialectic of alienating gazes. Just as the phenomenology of perception begins with a rigorous descriptive account of experience which founds our thetic grasp of the lived world, so also the phenomenology of sympathy situates itself within the conditions of the possibility of thematically and deliberately being sympathetic or antipathetic to others in adult relations (PP 425).!° He considers as derivative any phenomenology which takes its beginning from constitutive consciousness or its affective equivalent, namely the master-slave desire of recognition.
Just as thetic consciousness is only a founded and thus derived term understandable merely on the background of the pre-thematic primacy of perception, so also the dialectics of desire are for him derivative modes of intersubjectivity-intelligible because of the primacy of pre-personal sympathy.
Here a distinction must be drawn between the primordial, precommunicative sympathy of syncretic sociability in childhood and the adult sympathy of love. Only love is "a genuine sympathy" because the adult me, while remaining distinct from the adult alter, is capable of deliberately transgressing the known limits of identities (RO in PoP 120). Adult sympathy can never be a simple return to childhood; what separates the adult me from the primordial me is an intervening and decisive differentiation of ego-identity and alterity. 'The initial sympathy rests on the ignorance of oneself rather than on the perception of others, while adult sympathy occurs between "other" and "other"; it does not abolish the differences between myself and the other"(ibid.). It is obvious that Merleau-Ponty is not arguing for the primacy of love in same manner as he argues for the primacy of primordial sympathy: while primordial 9 "...in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar acceptance of it... from this break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world (later: the upsurge of Being). Sympathy, love, lived existence in the world all express the instituted, hermeneutically given significance which I do not constitute; they form my ego-identity and a field in which I can thematically and deliberately take up relations with the other. For Merleau-Ponty, the paradox of intersubjectivity can be resolved only in the shift of analysis from the abstract subject as object and corresponding derived modalities of alterity to an existential concretion of the subject as subject and its corresponding phenomenology of primordial sympathy.
II. THE THESIS OF THE PRIMACY OF SYMPATHY
We have seen how the paradox of intersubjectivity appeared to a representational consciousness. need not be necessarily known as a thetic act of deliberate sympathy. It is cognitively apprehended only when one lover smiles at the other to communicate love or when the alter refuses to smile back.
Merleau-Ponty argues that humans emerge from anonymous collectivity into a segregation of individuals; but segregation is never a fully completed process. Because, as a child, I begin in an ambiguous situation in which I know neither myself nor the alter, but live in both, I carry my "primordial me" as my inward weakness into adulthood (ibid., PP xii). My primordial weakness is neither egocentrism (Cartesian anxiety is not one's originary problem) nor the desire to be desired (the struggle for recognition is not my first dilemma) but rather syncretic sociability.
Merleau-Ponty carries out this argument, first, in what we have followed in the thesis of the primacy of perception as a critique of idealism and empiricism. Secondly, he argues by offering counterproofs from the cases of developmental pathologies. These strategies show how operative intentionality and primordial sympathy are presupposed in human desires, in thetic acts and in deliberate struggles for recognition. Primordial sympathy or syncretic sociability is his philosophical figure of operative intentionality when it comes to the treatment of alterity. 1 will follow with an example.
The pathological case of Schneider does negatively certify the thesis of the primacy of perception and sympathy. In his failure, Schneider fits the idealist and the empiricist accounts of our comportment toward others and to the world; if the idealist and the empiricist epistemologies are the measure of truth, then the world is as Schneider perceives and constitutes it. His problem is that he lacks operative intentionality and can neither pattern and live through his actions nor find unity in the world (PP 109,133,136,179,187,282). Does he suffer from the Cartesian or the Humean disease on the level of constitutive consciousness and sensing? Is he the slave of passions? No, he suffers from damage in motoric and gestural competencies. He can't coordinate through non-representational mimesis his motor activity with posture and the gestural dimension of expressivity. He can't live in his speech because of the breakdown on the level of primordial sympathy. He lacks the "intentional arc" which grounds all conceptual and thetic unity (PP 136). Because he does not suffer the Cartesian or the Humean predicament, but only appears to uphold the epistemological antinomies of idealism and empiricism, his case functions as a counter-proof for the thesis of the primacy of perception and the primacy of sympathy.
The above example of Merleau-Ponty's manner of proceeding in no manner implies a reduction of the thematic intentionality of acts, and of adulthood, to operative sympathy in children. His concern isn't that there is something wrong with constitutive consciousness. Schneider's case demonstrates that operative intentionality and sympathy are the conditions of the possibility of constitutive intersubjective existence.
Merleau-Ponty can argue for the primacy of primordial sympathy without illegitimately privileging the child because he supports his case against idealism and empiricism by developmental studies and at the same time offers counterproofs from an existential analysis of adult pathologies. Rather than multiplying his explanatory categories, he utilizes the argument from operative intentionality across the board:
ITlhe life of consciousness-cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life-is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. And it is this which 'goes limp' in illness (PP 136).
It is within Merleau-Ponty's focus on the primacy of operative sympathy that we need to set his interpretation of the specular drama of the differentiation between the 'primordial me' and the alter. Only thus we can purchase some understanding on why the phenomenology of sympathy takes precedence over the dialectic of desire in his model of alterity.
Even though the child's consciousness of its own body develops prior to the perception of the alter, the child is unable to privilege itself over the alter (RO in PoP 120). A six month old child will begin to explore one hand with the other (RO in PoP 123). These explorations allow for the initial differentiation between the interoceptive and the exteroceptive senses of one's body, between the touched and touching. Likewise first reactions to the alter are not visual but are shot through with the child's own introceptive data (RO in PoP 124f.). The child's own hand appears equally as foreign as that of the alter.
Research shows that there is a difference between animals and children in their reactions to the specular image of their own body in the mirror. A duck whose mate dies sits in front of a window pane where his specular image simulates the lost mate. The image is for the duck the lost animal, and the duck completes himself via this supplement, an imprint in the pane (RO in PoP 126). In the same fashion dogs react with fear to their own mirror-image and will not grasp its symbolic function. Similarly chimpanzees fail to acquire the symbolic meaning of the mirror-image as their image. A chimpanzee might pass his 'hand' behind the mirror and be 'disappointed' that there is nothing behind it, but he doesn't recognize himself in the mirror (RO in PoP 127). The six month old child, unlike the animal, will go through a process of differentiation of his own specular image from others. An eight month old child will act surprised when she sees herself in the mirror, but she does not yet possess the symbolic notion of her specular image. It is harder for the ego to grasp its own specular image before the mirror-image of the alter. The child can recognize the father in a mirror and smile at his image. The phenomenology of the smile, based on the thesis of the primacy of sympathy, can account for this incident. But even here the child does not thematically constitute this image as a symbol of the father. When the father speaks, the child turns from the mirror-image of the father to him and is astonished.
Why is it more difficult to apprehend one's own specular image than the one of the alter? Why does anonymous alterity precede a genuine differentiation of the ego from the alter? Even though the mirror-image loses its spatiality when the child reaches one year, the impossibility of a total reduction of the specular drama surfaces when symbolic and constitutive consciousness is in difficulty. Pathological cases reveal the nature of the child's original belief that one can occupy several spaces at once (RO in PoP 129). We find this notion in dreams, in hypnosis, in dying and drowning people. Apraxics cannot spatially co-ordinate their movements with objects before the mirror; also their function of mimesis is disturbed in simple imitation of the alter's movements in front of them (RO in PoP 130). If the reduction of the specular image into one's interoceptive self-identity were complete, if in fact thetic intentionality were constitutive of self-identity and alterity, then these cases could not be used as counterproofs.
In the commentary on Wallon's study of infants' reactions to their mirror-image, Merleau-Ponty does not argue for a return to the childhood world but for a paradigm of adult maturity (RO in PoP 154f.). In the last two pages of his commentary, Merleau-Ponty discusses freedom in the context of adult loving (also PP 378,381,434ff). To love is inevitably to enter into an undivided situation with another" (RO in PoP 154). In love I am torn away from my solitude and become mutually mediated with the alter. "(TJo be joined with someone else is...to live her life, at least in intention. To the very extent that it is convincing and genuine, the experience of the other is necessarily an alienating one" (ibid.). This sense of 'alienation' is evoked by risk, insecurity and doubt because in love there occurs a legitimate dispossession of the ego by the alter. The counter-example is an adult or a child who desires clear and distinct proofs of the other's affection: the adult only imprisons his desire to be desired by the alter in his absolute lone ego and the alter in the immediacy of desire (RO in PoP155).
Because the demand of proof represents the want of a total reduction of the other to an object, this illegitimate dispossession fails not only loving and dialogue but also freedom. Here Cartesianism and diehard empiricism betray all lovers. Whereas love dispossesses the ego for the sake of preserving alterity of the loved one, the attitude of sheer desire is fueled by violence towards itself and the alter. The lack of generosity and trust surfaces in every desire for a world free from risk.
Since there are no Cartesian or empiricist proofs of love apart from lived experience, love and reciprocal discourse heighten this risk to self-identity. The risk discloses an 'internal weakness' (PP xii) and insecurity within one's incomplete individuation. Just as the primacy of perception is Merleau-Ponty's "remedy to skepticism and pessimism/ so also with the thesis of the primacy of sympathy he denies the Sartrean verdict that human sympathy is an illusion. Merleau-Ponty argues that we meet the primordial sense of sympathy and even transitivism during adulthood (RO in PoP 154). Specific limiting situations in adult life will evoke the latent indistinction between the self and the alter. The fright of insecurity reoccurs not only within Cartesian anxiety but inevitably in love and dialogue. The age of three does not resolve the risks which mature relations solidt. Transitivism, which has been surpassed in the realm of immediate daily life, is never surpassed in the realm of feelings" (RO in PoP 155).
We should note what is important in Merleau-Ponty's analysis. The first three years of human development set the original theater for adult love and conflict. The internal weakness of primordial sympathy can't be apodictically overcome. The ontology of sympathy stipulates that I can be reconciled to that interior tie which bonds me with the alter without pathology and overt conflict. The phenomenology of love and dialogue argues that I ought to take up my primordial weakness and make it the strength of my adult relationships. The phenomenology of sympathy does not privilege the child, nor does it explain adult behavior by pathologies. The cases are used as counter-factuals which depict operative intentionality and sympathy as the horizon and the conditions of thematic intentionality in sustaining self-identity and alterity.
III. TOWARDS A COMMUNICATIVE AND EXISTENTIAL ETHIC
Just as Merleau-Ponty never wrote a phenomenology of sympathy, so also he did not develop a moral theory and an existential ethic. The following reconstruction is my programmatic proposal.
We must inquire whether and how the reappropriation of primordial affect of sympathy becomes justified in deliberate human relations. My distinction of the three developmental stages suggests that the cognitive and normative character of dialogic reciprocity can be Contrary to legitimate postmodern sensitivity to pathological modernity, communicative and existential ethics calls not for less but more evidential rationality, not for the death of an already disempowered identity but for an intensification of one's responsible existence through receptivity to the other. Ubiquity of power, totality, and revolutionary terror are problems only for the Cartesian, sdentistic, Party-and Frt/irer-oriented cogito but not for the self which relates to itself and alter as autonomous but disempowered subjectivities. Communicative and existential counterfactual operates in any will to discourse intensified through experience, understanding, judgment, and deliberation vis-a-vis its own powerlessness. We are not powerless because I or the alter could not act from the will to power. We are disempowered insofar as we will to discourse. 
